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Abstract This paper is a reconstruction of Levinas’ reading of Hegel and his
understanding of violence (of the enemy and the war). Combining Franz Rosen-
zweig’s reflections which concern the sick philosopher and Hegel’s state, as well as
Derrida’s interpretation of the different attributes of violence, our aim is also to give
full evidence of Derrida’s critical reading of Levinas. The first part illustrates the
various classifications of the figures of violence from the different periods of
Hegel’s life and the traces that these figures have left in Levinas’ texts beginning
with ‘Liberte´ et commandement’ in 1953. In the second part we discuss Hegel’s
well-known analogy from his Rechtsphilosophie on sovereignty and the organism—
that is to say the parallel reading of some paragraphs of Naturphilosophie too—and
the relation between totality and violence, in Levinas’ ‘ontology as allergy’ and in
Derrida’s autoimmunology.
Keywords Allergy  Homeopathy  Immunology  Other  Philosopher 
Sovereignty  Sickness  Violence
I insist upon the word ‘other’, o allos,1 a foreigner and the other who is left behind,
who is an other, another. How should (I hesitate to speak about thematisation and
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1 Allergy was first spoken of in Vienna, in German. Der Wiener Kinderarzt, Clemens Freiherr von
Pirquet, published a text about allergy in the journal Mu¨ncher Medizinische Wochenschrift in 1906. The
Greek root of this word is, of course, made up. Through an analogy with the word en-e´rgeia (internal
bodily force), von Pirquet makes the word all-e´rgeia, ‘als Ausdruck von Reaktionen auf ko¨rperfremde
Stoffe’.
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researching) action [ergon] directed towards the other and speaking [logos] of that
other (or the work or actions of that other) be pursued; that is, how should we
maintain resistance towards the other and the resistance of the other, in a
complicated context and on a path beginning with an analogy of sovereignty and
ending with attributes of violence?
The possibility of the figures of the ‘other’, ‘violence’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘war’ or
‘enemy’ being thematised and imagined through a new, more developed, and future
bio-analogy, always slightly more precise, should decide if there is justification for
the task I am undertaking. Nuance, and it is precisely within nuance that my hopes
lie, assumes that a more promising form, foreshadowing and bringing greater
security and greater protection for the other, may be found and always can be found.
But how can the detection of one or many violent acts in relation to the other,
which every allergology or immunology presupposes (and does allergy not already
belong to autoimmune strategies?), protect the other? Not protect me, nor us, nor the
same, nor my relations with the other (proving the same, or rendering the other
benign and non-threatening) but precisely, and most importantly, the other. Does
perhaps the protection of the other, certainly protection from me and from my
assimilation, conversely, presume the acceptance of allergy, of distance, and of
prevention? Does then an allergy or immunity to the other protect the other from us?
In the same way, can delicacy and a possible transformation of allergologies into
(auto) immunology, surpass all the problems associated with a change of meaning
and context (in the 1970s, ‘allergy’ was colloquially used to signify a reaction to the
other, even a ‘instinctive hostility’ or an ‘animosity before enmity’)? Does (auto)
immunology lead to greater protection of the other, because it retreats before the
other, or leaves it alone; because the same (me or us) clashes with itself as the other;
because the same divides itself; because it brings itself into question, it recognises
itself as the enemy and the other; because it fights with itself and with its own
fictitious fantasies of hostility and allergies?
Levinas asks:
Can the Same [le Meˆme] welcome the other [l’Autre], not by giving the other
to itself as a theme [en se le donnant pour theme] (that is to say, as being) but
by putting itself in question? Does not this putting in question [mise on
question] occur precisely when the other has nothing in common with me,
when the other is wholly other, that is to say, a human other [lorsqu’il est tout
autre, c’est-a`-dire Autrui]? (Levinas 1996, p. 16).
Despite the fact that chronic sickness has for centuries had a controversial status and
the advantage of differing elements which produce this (bio)analogy (and counter
analogy)—i.e., the whole, totality, the state, the community, the organism, the
body—I insist that it is precisely the secret condition and factor for the existence of
the analogy.
Sickness is the beginning, end, and the limiting frame of my words: Hegel’s
sickness of sovereignty and his homeopathic strategy, Rosenzweig’s therapy and
infusion into the sick and paralysed body of the philosopher [‘alle Symptome von
akuter Apoplexia philosophica’ (Rosenzweig 1999, p. 59)], Levinas’ discovery that
the source and birth of philosophy is in allergy [‘…that philosophy is truly born of
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an allergy’ (Levinas 1996, p. 16)], Derrida’s epithets and attributes of violence
(Derrida 1978, pp. 79–153) and his construction of immunity and autoimmunity as
the foundations of the community. I would first divide these four analogous
interventions, four disparate actions, into two columns. That is, I would like to
classify four differing thoughts on violence into just two divisions: on one side is
Hegel, ‘the mystic of violence’ (eine Mystiker der Gewalt), as Benjamin defines
him, and his moderator Rosenzweig (one of his most important readers); on the
other side are Emmanuel Levinas and his reader, the sometimes severe corrector and
moderator, Jacques Derrida. This division should resemble a series of common
breaks and unequal pauses in the chronology of one column. If, as a preliminary, I
had to formulate a new and different division on this same axis, where texts overlap
and continue one into the other, I would experiment and formulate things in a
completely different way. I would choose between two options: either I would
declare all four of these great undertakings and readings, these ‘great books of
violence and hostility’, as having a moderating intention—all of them attempt to
moderate or diminish the ‘extreme’ elements and differences which precede them
(even Hegel or, rather, Hegel more than any of the others); or I would set aside the
joint action of Rosenzweig and Levinas as the first and only true incident in the
history of Western thought. These are not merely a small episode or intermezzo, nor
a short respite in the histories of violence and trust arguing that violence is
necessary if a goal is to be attained; meaning that there is no justice, right, or law
without the use of violence and without war. This second option would then require
that this incident be an unrepeatable and rare occurrence par excellence, because it
stands strongly against the context it originates from and all that precedes it and
because, paradoxically, it owes its influence and persistence, I would say its
‘survival,’ to all that will proceed and occur after it. Therefore, between Hegel and
Derrida, Rosenzweig (with all of Levinas’ exaggerated caution and reservation in
his reading of Hegel) and Levinas himself would stand together. This sort of option
would present two problems and several levels of uncertainty and differing types of
responsibility.
First, following some of Derrida’s comments in the text ‘Violence and
Metaphysics’, the position, either of Rosenzweig or Levinas (I dare say that they
complement each other perfectly as both read different Hegelian texts), should
always be able, in every situation of a renewed belief in violence (meaning today,
immediately, now), to prove its adaptability and its contradiction in relation to
Hegel. The request that, for example, Levinas does not repeat, nor confirm, nor hide
his immanent Hegelianism [‘Levinas is very close to Hegel, much closer than
he admits, and at the very moment when he is apparently opposed to Hegel in the
most radical fashion’ (Derrida 1978, p. 99)], could be realised through the
continual evaluation of this position by means of Hegel’s differing formulas and
combinations.
The second point or responsibility produces the first and is found in what follows
from Derrida and his (Auto) immunology (I have pointed out that what is necessary,
for my proposed division to be justified, is at least a slight belief in its potential and
future). In order for the Rosenzweig–Levinas intervention, which speaks to the
principles of violence and war (therefore, the first institutes of philosophy) to
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survive, to become an exemplary incident, it would have to manifest its precision
readily and its advantage in opposing the great mystifications of violence before
Hegel. I am, for example, speaking of Kant, of the new tendency to inaugurate
Kant’s fantasies of peace, originating more than 200 years ago, as humanity’s most
effective answer to a crisis of international law and to a new justification for
violence and war.
Three of Hegel’s gestures from his lectures on the philosophy of right, three steps
in the construction of a fatal analogy, could perhaps formulate the first condition for
the construction of a strategy which encompasses several elements: war, violence,
sacrifice, sovereignty, negation, the enemy and the other. But before we get to
Hegel’s gestures and to a ‘Hegelian construction’ (this is what I would like to call it,
because it is exclusively Hegel’s and could be a condition for every theory of
violence, war, sacrifice, the enemy, etc… for Hegel), here are two parameters I
make use of and which serve as preambles of ‘Hegel’s construction’:
(a) I am trying to find Hegel through my reading of Rosenzweig and Levinas, that
is, the elementary ‘construction’ which the two of them immediately recognise as
Hegelian and instantly oppose. Rosenzweig uses the analogy of a sick philosopher, a
patient, as an idealism which should be turned around. So, what is it in Hegel that
should be turned around? Or, conversely, what is it that is sick and upside down in
Hegel? What is it in Hegel that is already in Rosenzweig’s sanatorium?
As we have observed, our patient suffers from a radical inversion [einer
vollkommenen Umkehrung] of his normal functions. It may be necessary to
reverse the inversion, that is, turn matters upside-down [dass es also
notwendig ist, diese Umkehr ihrerseits wieder umzukehren] (Rosenzweig
1999, p. 55).
(b) I am trying to find the ‘construction’ which has within itself, and also implies, all
Hegel’s possible theories of violence, negations, enemies, war, etc. One such always
problematic and disputable reduction of Hegel’s differing ideas and fragments must
cover, for example, two instances from Science of Logic, which concern violence
coming from the outside, about the other and the reaction to the other and about the
end and ‘mechanical violence’ (die mechanische Gewalt) (Hegel 1969, pp. 567,
746); determination about determination, negation, the border and the absolute other
from Encyclopaedia (just like Die Wissenschaft der Logik) (Hegel 1991, pp. 147–
150)2; argumentation about the other as evil, about self-recognition within the other
from the 1805/1806 semester (Jenenser Realphilosophie; Hegel 1931, pp. 200–203);
differing versions of the ‘struggle for recognition’ (der Kampf des Anerkennens),
wars and confrontations among states, but also positions concerning ‘external or
apparent beginning of states’ (a¨usserliche oder erscheinende Anfang), despite
understanding violence as the ‘basis of right’ (Grund des Rechts) or violence as a
‘substantial principle’ of the states (Hegel 1978, pp. 57–65); followed by Hegel’s
muddled suggestions concerning first violence (erste Gewalt), about the violence of
2 Paragraphs 91, 92 and 93 directly inspired Levinas. In them he could find the concepts of the same, the
other, the third and infinity.
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the hero, about the conversion of violence into right and about the battle for right,
etc.
Here are the three fragments which, I believe, construct the fastest path towards
Rosenzweig and Levinas.
After two paragraphs (§ 160 and § 161) in which Hegel speaks in detail of war
and sacrifice for the state, at the very end of the following paragraph (§ 162) in the
lectures on Natural Right in Heidelberg (semester 1817/1818), the philosopher
speaks about Kant’s project of perpetual peace which began with the idea that there
should be no war. However, Hegel says that war is ‘something ethically necessary’,
because without war peoples would be drawn into their private lives, ‘in security
and weakness’, and would thus be easy prey for other peoples. Hegel plays with this
idea in several places in texts from differing years. Hegel continues:
It is also a well-meaning thought, advanced some 30 years ago, that the human
race should form a single state.3 What holds the individual states together in
such a league of all states is merely an ‘ought’, and the whole league is based
on free choice [Willku¨r]. At all events the individual must desire the opposite
of war; but war is a philosophically essential element of nature [aber der Krieg
ist ein philosophisch wesentliches Naturmoment] (Hegel 1995, pp. 303–304).
Levinas himself could have formulated these two syntagma which do not exist in
this form in any other of Hegel’s texts—the ‘ethical necessity’ of war and war as
something ‘essentially philosophical’. War is not an element but is rather der
Naturmoment, just as states are small natural individuals which unite and gravitate
towards one whole. This movement towards one whole is always natural, essential,
and philosophical. This is war.
A two years later, in Die ‘Rechtsphilosophie’ von 1820 [named so by the editor
of these lectures Karl-Heinz Ilting (Hegel 1974a)], in a note to § 278 ‘Der Staat als
Subjekt der Souvera¨nita¨t’ (Hegel added these notes in the next several years), Hegel
explains the sovereignty. The third point, out of five, is called ‘Der Idealismus der
Souvera¨nita¨t’.
The idealism which constitutes sovereignty is the same characteristic as that in
accordance with which the so-called ‘parts’ of an animal organism are not
parts but members, moments in an organic whole, whose isolation and
independence spell disease [organische Momente sind und deren Isolieren und
Fu¨r-sich-Bestehen die Krankheit ist] (Hegel 1991, p. 738).4
Hegel probably wrote this sentence, in this form, in 1825. Since then it has
remained unchanged and has been identically reproduced in all the publications of
his Philosophy of Right at the beginning of § 278. Today, it is possible to follow the
3 In question is Kant’s text ‘U¨ber den Gemeinspruch’ (1793) in which he speaks of his ‘proposal for an
international state’ and at the same time of the ‘impracticability’ of such a project.
4 See also Hegel (1942), p. 180.
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genesis of Hegel’s argument as the crystallisation of the analogy between
sovereignty and the organism (organisation, body), and as the revelation of a
sickness which connects two differing levels of Hegel’s system. Before this 1825
version, there is no sickness in the lectures on right, despite the fact that sickness as
a latent metaphor is present from the beginning in Hegel’s political and juridical
texts. On the other hand, in an early text concerning Natural Right, sickness is
mentioned and the analogy is set in the same form as it will be later, but at that time
Hegel lacks the figures of sovereignty and the organism.
Sickness and the onset of death are there when one part organizes itself and
eludes the dominion of the whole. By this isolation the part affects the whole
negatively or even compels it to organize itself for this sphere alone—as, for
example, when the vitality of the entrails, in obedience to the whole, develops
into individual animals, or the liver makes itself into the ruling organ and
forces the whole organism to do its bidding (Hegel 1975, p. 123).
For Hegel sickness (as well as differing versions of hypochondria5) is something
much greater than a simple trauma which marked his life and which was, after all, a
frequent follower of philosophers and philosophy. Hegel proclaims the unity of a
state or the health and completeness of an organism through openness and the
possibility of war (§ 321–324). Hegel continues that only through sacrifice
(Aufopferung) is idealism attained and the real arrived at (as a spirit or national
spirit; Hegel 1974b, p. 669).
Hegel’s third gesture is also quite difficult to locate in time. That fragment is also
the result of Ilting’s work. In question is certainly a later or perhaps even final Hegel,
and a part of his commentary in § 273 Philosophy of Right (‘Die drei Gewalten’)
called ‘Eine naturphilosophische Analogie’ (Hegel 1974b, p. 662). Hegel differen-
tiates between the abstract moments of a state (gesetzgebende Gewalt, Regierungs-
gewalt, individuelle Gewalt) and a concrete concept of a state, as a living whole in
which every moment, in itself, organises totality. Hegel defines the philosophical-
natural analogy as a living body (lebendige Ko¨rper) in possession of three
determinations. The second determination, as Hegel writes (the first being sensibility,
that is perception, and the third reproduction) is Irritibilita¨t or Irratibilita¨t.
Diese Momente bestimmen sich nun als Systeme… das der Irratibilita¨t ein
abstraktes System welches das Herz zu seinem Mittelpunkte hat, das System
der Andern.
The system of the other, or the other’s system, is found in the centre of a living body
or living organism. The other’s system is at the heart of the state.
All of Hegel’s conditions (and there are certainly more than the three which I
sketched here) make the final construction more comprehensible. Hegel himself
says—and we saw his signal—that it is found in § 293 of the first edition of
Encyclopaedia ‘The disease of the Individual’ (or § 371) or somewhere nearby.
Hegel’s request that we look at his demonstrations of the latest theories of sickness,
5 The notion of hypochondria is present in Hegel’s system since his 1803/1804 lectures in Jena (Hegel
1931, pp. 200–203). See also Rosenzweig (1962a, pp. 101–102).
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pharmacology and alternative therapies, while we try to understand the figures of
the state, sovereignty, war, enemy, the other or sacrifice and violence, paradoxically
represents a danger to the consistency of the system. ‘Homeopathy’,6 one more
invented Greek word used twice and explained in detail by Hegel, is a strategy
which resolves one of the greatest dilemmas of his political philosophy. However,
homeopathy introduces magic into dialectics, broadening the importance of analogy
(the analogy becomes not only the regulative but also the constitutive instrument of
a system, as analogy is in itself therapy), it gives an advantage to the same, and not
to the different or the other (homeopathy presumes a negation through the same, and
not with the other or different or opposite, which would be a characteristic of
allopathy), etc.
What then are we to find in the therapies for a sick organism, which can only
explain the secret poison which has suddenly appeared in a sick state and a state
without war?7 Can, equipped only with this insight into medicine, into fatal
sickness, the secret of that strange strategy and fantastic power of one sovereign
government to organise a war for its own sovereignty (its own people), be revealed?
Levinas analyses Hegel’s famous fragment from Phenomenology of Spirit, on 5
March 1976 in his lecture on Hegel’s Logic (Levinas 1993, pp. 93–97). Hegel says:
But Spirit is at the same time the power of the whole, which brings these parts
together again into a negative unity, giving them the feeling of their lack of
independence, and keeping them aware, that they have their life only in the
whole. […] The Spirit of universal assembly and association is the simple and
negative essence of those systems which tend to isolate themselves. In order
not to let them become rooted and set in this isolation, thereby breaking up the
whole and letting the [communal] spirit evaporate, government has from time
to time to shake them to their core by war. By this means the government
upsets their established order, and violates their right to independence, while
the individuals who, absorbed in their own way of life, break loose from the
whole and strive after the inviolable independence and security of the person,
are made to feel in the task laid on them their lord and master, death (Hegel
1977, pp. 272–273).
But how is this possible? How does the government of one state or a sovereign,
order a war? How is the ‘sovereign conserver’ (this was Hahnemann’s favourite
metaphor) able to risk his own body’s death and dose itself with war? What part of
sovereignty is always apart from itself? Is the government in secret contact with the
enemy? Is a virtual enemy or virtual danger in question? What has happened to the
6 Its creator, Samuel Friedrich Christian Hahnemann, a contemporary of Hegel, arrived in Berlin in
January 1831, only a month after Hegel’s death. Hahnemann’s students are spread across Europe taking
care of Cholera victims, a disease which arrived in Western Europe from India through Russia.
7 ‘Secret poison’ is a secret for Hegel, and he cites Gibbon: ‘This long peace, and the uniform
government of the Romans, introduced a slow and secret poison into the vitals of the empire [geheimes
Gift in die Lebenskra¨fte des Reichs]. The minds of men were gradually reduced to the same level, the fire
of genius was extinguished, and even the military spirit evaporated…’ (Hegel 1975, pp. 101–102).
Derrida mentions this fragment in his book Glas (1974, p. 117).
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victims and sacrifices? How large a part (an amount, number, dose) must be taken
away from the whole for it still to be a whole?
It seems as if in Hegel, the ghost of the analogy (and sickness) circulates between
(his) body and the state, and as if these lines from the book Phenomenology of Spirit
are preceded by Hegel’s thoughts concerning medicine and therapy, and Hegel’s
intuition and the suggestions of an eternal patient. In the addition to §373, which
concerns various therapies, Hegel finally finds affirmation. This paragraph begins
with sentences bearing a striking resemblance to the understanding of sickness and
medicine in the Jena lectures (Hegel 1932, pp. 174–187; Hegel 1931, pp. 167–174):
It is by means of the healing agent [Heilmittel] that the organism is excited
into annulling the particular excitement in which the formal activity of the
whole is fixed, and restoring the fluidity of the particular organ or system
within the whole. […] In so far as they are negative stimuli, medicaments are
poisons [Die Arzneimittel sind insofern negative Reize, Gifte]. When the
external and alien substance of an indigestible stimulant is administered to an
organism alienated from itself by disease, this organism is forced to counter its
effect by drawing itself together and entering into a process, by means of
which it regains its sentience and subjectivity [Selbstgefu¨hl und zu seiner
Subjektivita¨t wieder gelange] (Hegel 1970, p. 202).
This is followed by the above-mentioned addition:
Homoeopathic theory [homo¨opathischen Theorie] in particular treats illness
by prescribing an agent capable of bringing forth the same disease in a healthy
body. The effect of introducing this poison into the organism, and in general,
of confronting it with something obnoxious, is that the particularity in which
the organism is fixed becomes something external for it. When the organism is
diseased, however, this particularity is still one of its own properties. (Hegel
1970, p. 205) […] Every disease, and especially acute disease, is a
hypochondria of the organism [Hypochondrie des Organismus], in which
the organism loathes the external world and repulses it. The reason for this is
that it is restricted to itself while containing its own negative. As the medicine
now stimulates it into digesting this negative, however, the organism is
restored to the general activity of assimilation. The precise way in which this
effect is obtained is by administering to the organism something which is
much more potently indigestible than its disease, and so forcing it to draw
itself together in order to overcome it. This results in the internal division of
the organism; for us the initially immanent indisposition has now become
external, the organism has been duplicated internally into its vital force and its
diseased parts. This effect of medicine may well be regarded as magical. It
resembles the effect of mesmerism in bringing the organism under the power
of another person, for it is by means of the medicament that the whole
organism is subjected to this specific determination succumbing as it were to
the power of a magician [der Gewalt eines Zauberers] (Hegel 1970, p. 206).
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Deciding which remedies are the right ones now presents us with a difficulty (Zu
sagen, welches nun die rechten Mittel seien, ist schwer). In general, it may be said
that the relationship between disease and medicine is a magical one (Das Verha¨ltnis
der Krankheit zur Arznei ist u¨berhaupt ein magisches).
This magical fragment which Jacques Derrida notices and partially analyses in
the book Glas [he only mentions and does not focus on ‘l’home´opathie,
l’hypocondrie, l’hypnose, le sommeil re´parateur’ (Derrida 1974, pp. 132–134)] is
one of the final novelties of the system. Homeopathy is an addition to the system
and a paradigm change, despite the fact that Hegel has no more time, nor gives it
any special status. Homeopathy is just another form of therapy; but it is not the one
and only therapy replacing all others, nor can any other therapy take its place.
However, its significance, its militancy and at the same time its greatness, and its
magic, is comprised of the influence of the other (or the influence of another man;
here autre becomes Autrui).8 The problem now is the misrecognition and
misinterpretation of the same and the other, the transformation of the same into
the other and, conversely, the internal divisions into the same and the other, the
infinite production of the other, the negation of the other and the power of the other
to be the carrier of this negation.
Homeopathy, as the final addition to the system, deconstructs his system in
several stages. I would like to note and list several moments:
• Homeopathy enters the system as therapy, in place of the organism’s sickness,
unsuccessful treatment, death and the appearance of the spirit;
• Homeopathy is the kind of therapy that counts on the unity and wholeness of the
entire organism (this is its main difference in relation to allopathy);
• As therapy, as something artificial, its strategies and consequences are
necessarily political—meaning that this strategy requires a subject or sovereign
(the brain, ratio, philosopher, statesman) who can take care of body, organism,
text, system, sovereignty, people;
• Just as Hegel sends the readers of Philosophy of Right to read his Philosophy of
Nature, so his first student, and the first to deconstruct his text, makes a counter
analogy. In the margins of Hegel’s book System der Philosophie (1841),
written by Karl Ludwig Michelet, he adds the following note to Hegel’s addition
§373:
This does not contradict the statement made just previously, that poison is
more powerful, the form in which it makes itself effective is less potent
[denn eben weil das sta¨rkere Gift in minder ma¨chtiger Form], being a
merely external hostility [a¨ußerer Feind], which is more easily overcome
than the internal hostility of the disease itself [als der innere Feind,
welcher die Krankheit selber ist] (Hegel 1970, p. 205).
• The homeopathic strategy corrects Hegel’s understanding of sickness, which had
generally remained the same from his earliest texts: the sickness of an organism
8 Hegel already writes about violence and power [Gewalt] of magic over the organism or power [Macht]
of the foreign over the organism in his 1818/1819 lectures (Hegel 1982, § 295, pp. 144–145).
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is a result of, in the last instance, the inorganic that an organism still contains
within itself (‘Der Organismus hat nun seine unorganische Potenz an sich
selbst, so bezieht er sich als ein Unorganisches auf sich’).9 The drama of
sickness, and then death, occurs because the inorganic has not been completely
overcome. Symptoms of the inorganic are a division of the organism,
hypochondria and the isolation of parts of the organism. The homeopathic
intervention which is to follow is multilayered: it uncovers (a) that the other
(with the inorganic as its prototype) cannot be fully incorporated and
assimilated; (b) that there exists an excess or waste or negation which is not
calculated into the system or into the organism and which is useless; (c) that
there is an external (‘das A¨usserliche ist so fu¨r mich ein Anderes aber ein
ideelles Anderes’) (Hegel 2000, p. 248) an other, a spiritual [Geistiges] (Hegel
1982, §295, p. 144), medicine, foreigner, poison, enemy, that is supremely
indigestible by the organism, and which is just as hard to incorporate (this is how
the idea of an absolute other, who can only initiate or whose purpose is to
provoke an entity into being, but not be a part of it, was discovered; this is the
other as a laxatif, the other who cannot be eaten, or the other who cannot not be
Exkretion);10 (d) that the exterior is analogous to (and not the same as) the
interior, hence the other (the same) which is added to the sick organism is
analogous to the inorganic, already present in the organism; (e) that it is the
other, or that the enemy is a function and that it is virtual.
‘Was den Menschen interessirt ist sein Anderes’, says Hegel (Hegel 2000,
p. 251). The other is not, but its silhouette is already framed, clear; its place has been
discovered, its independence is on its way. Despite the other completely functioning
in order to constitute the organism, despite the other not bringing life—life and vital
energy are not within it—its task in forming a subject was never before as it is in
this homeopathic construction.
This construction is implicitly present within the Rosenzweig–Levinas turn; more
precisely, their intervention or therapy becomes possible only with Hegel’s late
addition, of which they never directly speak. This can be seen in their strong
resistance to Hegel and in the insistence on therapy which is always in absolute
contradiction to what is in essence and exclusively ‘Hegel’s’ or ‘Hegelian’ in
philosophy and in thought. In spite of the correctness of marking the limits of such
an inversion of Hegel and in showing reservations towards the achieved outcome (is
Derrida not trying to do this all the time, while reading Levinas?), perhaps it is still
necessary to defend the future of an action which has only now begun.
Rosenzweig and Levinas add to one another in their resistance to and conversion
of Hegel’s position. It is possible to show systematically both the complementary
and simultaneous nature of Rosenzweig’s reconstruction and the inversion of
Hegel’s figures of sovereignty (their analogies with the organism) (see Rosenzweig
1962b, pp. 130–133, 142–147), Levinas’ transforming of Hegel’s sacrifice for the
homeland into a relationship and meeting with the other, Rosenzweig’s modification
9 This is one of the formulations from Hegel’s Lectures (Hegel 2002a, pp. 185–186).
10 See the chapter ‘Prozess der Gattung’ in Hegel (2002b, pp. 196–197).
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of the relations between violence (Gewalt) and right, Levinas’ attempt to rethink
negation while commending Hegel’s efforts, Rosenzweig’s insistence on life, and
Levinas’ pages on war from Totality and Infinity (Levinas 1969, pp. 220–232), etc.
Probably, even before these grand themes, there exists an imminent proximity
and similarity to their efforts (Derrida would say that this proximity is ‘empirical’).
Rosenzweig formulates that first act of philosophising and thinking against Hegel
with the simple fact that he is alive (and that he is philosophising), while Levinas
believes that the first act must be against philosophy, against Hegel, in order to
protect the life of the other and in so doing defend subjectivity.
We both know, writes Rosenzweig to a sanatorium director into which a sick
philosopher is to be placed (and not only the philosopher, of course;
Rosenzweig’s idea is that only common sense and the power of life itself can
remedy the ‘sickness of reason’), that a sick reason can only be cured if it is
restored—by an application of some force, if necessary—to its normal
environment. The task is not to ‘infuse’ the patient’s reason with something
new, but to return it to the condition from which is deviated. We must fight the
various mountebank cures, the ointments, the vaccinations, old or new, with
the slogan ‘Environmental treatment’ […] ‘Environmental cure’ [eine reine
Terrainkur] (Rosenzweig 1999, pp. 60–61).
This is Levinas’ ‘wind’, ‘une subjectivite´ libre comme le vent’ (Levinas 1969,
p. 22). Opening for the other begins with breathing, with the lungs (lungs are the
real subject and the real beginning, a beginning before any other beginning).
Resistance to Hegel begins with the mistrust of medicine, with the mistrust of its set
practices. Levinas’ first gesture must demolish ‘l’association de la philosophie et de
l’Etat, de la philosophie et de la medicine’. Only within this context, where
philosophy necessarily splits with the state and medicine, can Levinas’ sudden
engagement and his alternative allergology be understood. More precisely, in
question is a speech against allergy (‘d’une insurmontable allergie’),11 a discourse
against allergy, therefore an appeal for relaxation but caution at the same time.
The effort of this book (Totality and Infinity) is directed toward apperceiving
in discourse a non-allergic relation with alterity [une relation non allergique
avec l’alte´rite´], toward apperceiving desire—where power, by essence
murderous of the other, becomes, faced with the other and ‘against all good
sense’, the impossibility of murder, the consideration of the other, or justice
(Levinas 1969, p. 47).
However, does Levinas’ call for the destruction of allergies to the other still belong
to allergologies? Is an engagement which resists every form of allergy (therefore,
engagement which is ethical),12 in other words, is an allergy to allergies in the
domain of allergology? Is an anti-allergy or counter allergy still an allergy? And
11 ‘La philosophie est atteinte, depuis son enfance, d’une horreur de l’Autre qui demeure Autre, d’une
insurmontable allergie’ (Levinas 2001, p. 263).
12 ‘The relation with the other, or conversation, is a non-allergic relation, an ethical relation’; ‘encounter
the other without allergy, that is, in justice’ (Levinas 2001, pp. 51, 303).
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would this leftover allergy, this resistance to every form of allergy towards the
other, be the subject’s last chance?
Can Levinas’ ‘defence of subjectivity’, from the preface of the book Totality and
Infinity, be formulated in such a way?
It is as if there is something inaccurate and suspicious in the thematisation of
Levinas’ preliminary resistance and dissatisfaction with the status of the other. It is as
if there is something dangerous in these questions, something which denounces
Levinas, betrays him and immediately troubles us. All these questions—as well as the
forced attention I give to a confused moment which precedes, in Levinas, the allergy to
the other (this can be an allergy to an allergy to the other or an allergy whose traces
remain even when there is no longer an allergy and no longer an other)—I risk
qualifying with ‘philosophical standard’, or ‘philosophical mannerism’. This moment
(again Hegel and his Momente) is closely associated with philosophy and with reading
which belongs to the ‘philosophical regime,’ as it thematises the non-thematised (for
example, an allergy which precedes the allergy Levinas consistently mentions). This is
not all. It is also an objectification, a reduction, an imposing of horizons, and violent
revelation of violence (violence of allergies and violence which remains hidden and
unnamed as allergy). This is the moment which sustains and generates philosophy,
simultaneously degenerating it. Only a philosopher, perhaps only Hegel, can say the
sentence which Jacques Derrida spoke: ‘Levinas is very close to Hegel, much closer
than he admits, and at the very moment when he is apparently opposed to Hegel in the
most radical fashion.’ The only thing that remains for us is to experiment with this
moment; one for which it remains unclear who should take responsibility: I, Levinas,
Derrida, Hegel or only Hegel, Hegel, and forever Hegel? How then should we again
read, using Derrida’s or Hegel’s methods (how can we thematise without any
thematisations?), the status of allergy in Levinas or in Hegel, and simultaneously
maintain radical resistance to Hegel, Levinas, or Derrida? A question such as this can
be preceded by new questions and new answers in relation to allergy before allergy or
violence before violence or, in general, in connection with the attributes of violence.
If we were now to follow Derrida’s readings and philosophical standards, completely
new consequences would be revealed but, simply put, Hegel, will no longer be so closely
associated with Levinas. There are several stages of this one moment:
• Levinas introduces allergy as a negative strategy and calls (us) (in the vocative)
to resist, negate or develop an allergy towards it. The other is not thematised or
‘placed’ in the accusative (Derrida 1978, p. 95), rather, the negation of the other
is thematised or the allergy towards the other itself. Thematisation without
thematisation is achieved through Levinas’ swift change of plan and rapid
transition from accusative to vocative, meaning through a call for the negation of
negation (that is, an allergy to allergy).
• Levinas will be close to Hegel and within the frames of Hegel’s negation of
negation only if this call is put aside, if the vocative is pushed aside, and only if
the concept of the ‘other’ is placed back into Hegel’s milieu (where the other is
my negation, where the other is a negation of the same).
• In this case, and only in this case (this is the case when, in one’s reading, we
look for oversights, blind spots, ignorance, subconscious, unthematised fields),
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the subject will be constituted through the process of revealing the other; that is,
through the process of destroying negation or everything that negates the other.
The subject confirms himself (the subject is defended) as he destroys all that
negates the other, as he becomes allergic to every allergy towards the other. Or,
rather, the subject preserves the other only if it destroys what negates the other.
• It now becomes simple to follow two new elements expanded in Levinas, before
and after Derrida’s intervention: (a) that violence is necessary, that the subject is
violent, that necessary violence which precedes every possible violence is set
aside; this violence is complementary to the violence of thematisation (Derrida
endeavoured to desubstantialise violence in Levinas, to find one or several
acceptable attributes of violence; I believe that his intervention was not entirely
justified); (b) that the possibility of violence always appears with a third, that is,
with one who negates the other—this could be in the place of allergy (over time
Levinas recognises the subject of violence or the violent subject who defends its
neighbour as the state or as the justified state violence; Derrida’s sensitivity,
deliberation, and consideration towards Israel and Palestinians is always in
dialogue with Levinas).
Despite the fact that between Rosenzweig and Levinas, between two modes of the
same intervention on which I am insisting, the figure of the other has changed and
become more dangerous than ever, it seems to me that there is no room for hesitation:
first, Levinas’ allergy definitely refers to Hegel’s ‘theory of the other’; second,
allergy is, for Levinas, an absolute and perfect synonym for Hegel’s homeopathy—is
the furious reaction and allergy to the other, to medicine/poison, not crucial for
Hegel? Is provoking resistance and the allergy of the organism towards the other not
the essence of homeopathic therapy? Third, Levinas’ substitution of homeopathy
with allergy turns Hegel upside-down—what is therapy for Hegel is still sickness for
Levinas. Fourth, Levinas’ new step, and resistance to allergy is more than the usual
resistance to homeopathy—allergy assumes the harmlessness and the innocence of
the other, while anti-allergy necessitates the examination of the secret of fiction and
fantasy about the dangerous and toxic other. Fifth, the over-occupation with one’s
own resistance and allergy to the other, frees and relieves the other—the other
(‘l’autre inassimilable’ in both Hegel and Levinas), still helps in constituting
Levinas’ new subjectivity, but not as in a homeopathic construction, as the other who
fictitiously bombards and attacks the organism.
The relation with the other—the absolutely other [absolument autre]—who
has no frontier with the same is not exposed to the allergy that afflicts the same
in a totality, upon which the Hegelian dialectic rests. The other is not for
reason a scandal which launches it into dialectical movement… The alleged
scandal of alterity presupposes the tranquil identity of the same [l’identite´
tranquille du Meˆme], a freedom sure of itself which is exercised without
scruples, and to whom the foreigner brings only constraint and limitation
(Levinas 1969, p. 203).
Levinas’ fragment is a good example of his numerous effortless ‘turns’ of Hegel. If
we must sketch a position for a new reader (and a therapist, and immunologist), he
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will truly have to confirm and still think this great distance—on the one hand, not
having a frontier with the other and the same, and on the other hand ‘allergie qui
afflige le Meˆme’ (the allergy that afflicts the same).
In a book in which he bids his farewell to Levinas, Derrida circles the concept of
allergy many times and in so doing marks a future step which is on the path of
forever releasing the other of responsibility for the frontier, for allergy, for affliction
and for pain.
The introduction or the sketch of an introduction (or simply a ‘sketch of a
sketch’) of a name signifying a rare disease, is the perfect addition and substitute for
allergy. Namely, it is quite hard to define the precise differences between allergy
and autoimmunisation. Is allergy simply one of the many autoimmune illnesses or is
autoimmunisation a particular aspect of every allergy? The answer is quite
complicated; however, the accent and deciding factor is this ‘auto’, and this is also
an addition to Levinas. The precision of Derrida’s intervention, as the accuracy of
Levinas’ engagement, is truly diverse: immunis supposes only a single part of the
organism or system; this is a privileged part with a special status (that is why it is
called the immune system) whose chief characteristic is not only to protect the
whole system, but rather it is the part where the other appears and is recognised as
the other;13 a part which recognises the other simultaneously recognising its own
limits; the immune system can and cannot recognise the other, nor can it
differentiate its own destructive elements (cancer or AIDS); this part can protect its
own system from the other, but can also tolerate the other; the immune system can
be lulled and drugged (‘la de´sensibilisation’)14 and it can tolerate the other above
limits (‘a` faciliter la tole´rance de certaines greffes d’organes’) or above all its own
limits; the immune system can also produce the other within itself and from itself
(horror autotoxicus) and then destroy it.
Derrida rarely uses the nominative (‘auto-immunite´’), he insists on the process or
the logic of auto-immunitaire and uses differing excessive descriptions (la logique
terrifiante, fatale, suicidaire, e´trange, indispensable, etc.). He repeats Levinas’s or
Michelet’s gesture: returning this logic (or this word) into the political-law space
from which it was born, in order to profit from the bio-medical constructions and
mechanisms that this illness implies (conversely, Hegel also confirms this tactic:
homeopathy did not come from therapeutics into the political logic of the sovereign
or philosopher, rather it was the other way around) (Silverstein 1989, p. 1). But it is
here, with this change of context, that this rare illness or this rare family of illnesses
suddenly becomes something necessary and elementary within one community,
society or state. All this seems to be completely imprecise and forceful, including
the definition of this logic which Derrida ceaselessly repeats (‘As for the process of
auto-immunisation, which interests us particularly here, it consists of a living
organism, as is well known and in short, of protecting itself against its
13 ‘The immune substances… in the manner of magic bullets, seek out the enemy’, Paul Ehrlich (see
Silverstein 1989).
14 The concept of Paul Ehrlich (see Silverstein 1989, p. 160).
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self-protection by destroying its own immune system [a` se prote´ger en somme
contre son autoprotection en de´truisant ses propres de´fenses immunitaires]’).15
Apart from this, Derrida lacks Levinas’ vocative and any sort of call for the negation
of this destructive self-negation. There is no call for the isolation and destruction of
this logic; rather, Derrida always speaks of it in the accusative, as if speaking of an
occurrence which happens continuously and in parallel within the state or anywhere
else (‘Once again the state is both self-protecting and self-destroying, at once
remedy and poison. The pharmakon is another name, an old name, for this
autoimmunitary logic’) (Derrida 2003, p. 124). But what is fatal in this logic, if it
can still be thematised and calculated in the ‘living system’ or ‘living organism’?
What is it that is fatal to this ‘fatal logic’ auto-immunitaire? An excess of violence
or violence which cannot be a part of any sort of economy of violence forces
Derrida to correct himself. Here are several sentences from Derrida’s book Voyou:
For what I call the autoimmune consists not only in harming or ruining oneself
[a` se nuire ou a` se ruiner], indeed in destroying one’s own protections, and in
doing so oneself, committing suicide or threatening to do so [a` se suicider ou a`
menacer de le faire], but, more seriously still, and through this, in threatening
the I [moi] or the self [soi], the ego or the autos, ipseity itself, compromising
the immunity of the autos itself: it consists not only in compromising oneself
[s’auto-entamer] but in compromising the self, the autos—and thus ipseity. It
consists not only in committing suicide but in compromising sui- or self-
referentiality, the self or sui- of suicide itself. Autoimmunity is more or less
suicidal, but, more seriously still, it threatens always to rob suicide itself of its
meaning and supposed integrity. (Derrida 2005, p. 45).
It seems that the circle of violence towards the other can only now be completed.
Levinas’ radical move of bringing himself into question can now be recognised as
ringing an end to the border between the same and the other. The foundations of
violence which auto-immunology attempts truly to thematise must be thought again
in confrontation with hypochondria as auto-assimilation and as the prototype of
every illness according to Hegel. But not only this. The success which homeopathy
achieves in the therapies of patients with autoimmune illnesses (these sorts of
accounts and experiences should never be considered of secondary importance)
confirms Hegel’s presence and demands from us the discovery of a new radical
approach.
Derrida is very close to Hegel, much closer than he admits, and at the very
moment…
15 The police does not destroy the police, just as the immune system does not destroy the immune
system. When they receive the wrong information from monitoring cells, the so-called killer cells do not
kill themselves; rather they attack other living, healthy cells, of the same living organism. In question is a
mix-up of levels, a mix-up of murder with suicide, changes and conflicts with identity, and, of course,
complete limitation of the concept of survival (Derrida 1998, p. 80).
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